I wonder why it is always the case that the period of time just before year end is suddenly very hectic! There must be a universal law about that, something like Murphy's Law...
Anyway, I have just returned from 2 weeks of travel around Italy, Sweden and the US visiting customers and presenting our solutions. I always enjoy meeting folks and seeing what they can do with our software as I love to see the latest and greatest devices; and so I have been negligent in posting to my blog for that time and noticed over the last few weeks some noticeable events have taken place.
Firstly we had the final certification of the Airbus A380, a long awaited event, especially after the reported delays [See blogs by John Bruggerman and Paul Parkinson] . I noticed an interesting point in the press release on this. Namely that the certification had begun with system tests in 2001. This shows you the amount of time and effort it takes to take a complex aircraft such as the A380 through certification. I was amused by the lack of software mentioned in the press release, I guess most readers don't want to hear the aircraft is flown by software these days?
Secondly, we had the first flight of the long awaited F-35 Lightning II. The UK government has also finally signed up to the next phase of the project which means we can expect to see some UK business for F-35 over the next few years. It is kind of interesting seeing these arguments over technology transfers in a company who has embraced Open Source in a big way!
Both of these aircraft are using RTCA DO-178B for software certification, so I think I'll take a look at that standard. I wonder if the UK F-35 will be accepted with DO-178B or will they need our own DEF STAN 00-56?
Which brings me to the point of my blog, which is why are there so many software safety standards out there? It seems that this area of software development that does need to consider a little standardising of it's own, or even using a standard of standards (I guess you can do that if (as Paul Tingey discusses) you can have a "consortia of consortia"?)
It seems each time a new aircraft (certainly military), or unusual project begins, committees form and new standards for software safety emerge, even though the FAA and RTCA have been using DO-178B for a number of years, and very successfully too.
Some of the customers I met with do have another issue on this; that is they are creating devices that could put lives at risk in systems that do not have an applicable safety authority, such as land vehicles or submersibles (which reminds me - I must find out if the road safety authorities look at software safety).
The time spent on creating these "new" safety standards would be better spent utilising what already exists - if all of these efforts had been used to enhance best practices around the use of DO-178B wouldn't that make the device software world a whole lot safer? After all isn't that one of the key tenets of DSO?
Alex Wilson is a Senior Program Manager with Wind River in the UK, working with Aerospace and Defence customers across EMEA. In this role, Alex has the opportunity to meet with A&D customers and partners across EMEA and help define the A&D Strategy at Wind River.
